Proofs of Useless Work -- Positive and Negative Results for Wasteless
  Mining Systems by Dotan, Maya & Tochner, Saar
Proofs of Useless Work
Positive and Negative Results for Wasteless Mining Systems
Maya Dotan
MayaDotan@mail.huji.ac.il
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Saar Tochner
saart@cs.huji.ac.il
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT
Many blockchain systems today, including Bitcoin, rely on Proof of
Work (PoW). Proof of work is crucial to the liveness and security
of cryptocurrencies. The assumption when using PoW is that a
lot of trial and error is required on average before a valid block is
generated. One of the main concerns raised with regard to this kind
of system is the inherent need to "waste" energy on “meaningless”
problems. In fact, the Bitcoin system is believed to consume more
electricity than several small countries [5].
In this work we formally define three properties that are neces-
sary for wasteless PoW systems: (1) solve “meaningful" problems
(2) solve them efficiently and (3) be secure against double-spend
attacks.
We analyze these properties, and deduce constraints that impose
on PoW systems. In particular, we conclude that under realistic
assumptions, the set of allowed functions for mining must be preim-
age resistant functions. Finally, we propose a modification to the
Bitcoin consensus rule that allows users to upload a certain subset
of preimage resistant problems and let the mining process solve
them. We prove security against Double-Spend attacks identical to
the existing security guarantee in Bitcoin today.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin[14]) are distributed (and often
decentralized) currencies. Bitcoin offered a revolutionary way for
people to control the currency, potentially independent of govern-
ments and central power. Bitcoin operates on top of the Blockchain
(a Merkel tree of blocks) in which each block encapsulates mone-
tary transactions. The blockchain is an appendable data structure.
A transaction is valid only upon being included in a block. Security
in Bitcoin translates to ensuring that the Blockchain is constantly
appended, and it is appended in the same way across all users in the
system (consistency). Appending the blockchain is done through
a process called "Mining", and block creators are called "Miners".
It is of vital importance to the health of the protocol that mining
is not controlled by an adversary. In particular, it is vital that the
rate of blocks created is regulated, and that block creation is not
vulnerable to Sybil attacks. The most popular method for regulat-
ing block creation is through "Proof of Work" (most commonly
known as mining). In a proof of work system, in order to create a
block, users (miners) must supply a proof of performing a sufficient
amount of "computational work". This is commonly enforced via
requiring users to find a solution to a problem which is believed
to be computationally hard, in the sense that the best method for
solving it is via brute force.
In Bitcoin, Mining works as follows: A difficulty parameter D is
dictated by the protocol. Then, miners start guessing binary strings
(according to a certain format dictated by the protocol). If a miner
comes up with a string s (which depends on the previous block and
the block content) such that h(s) < D 1, they get to create the new
block. Since it is believed that inverting h is hard, it stems that the
optimal way of finding such an s is via repeated trial and error.
Since solving this puzzle takes a measurable amount of com-
putational resources, it holds that with overwhelming probability,
miners can only create blocks at a rate which is proportional to
the percent of the computational power in the network. From this
property stems the security guarantee of Bitcoin - As long as no
single user controls a majority2 of the computational power in
the network, then the probability of inconsistency across users
decreases exponentially with the number of blocks created. In this
sense, proof of work is what ensures that the Bitcoin system is
secure.
Upon creating a new block, the miner will broadcast it to all of
the network, and all users will in turn append this block to their own
local view of the blockchain. A miner which succeeds in mining
a block is awarded a prize, and gets to decide which transactions
are included in the newly created block. The Blockchain must be
constantly extended in order to keep the system alive. In Bitcoin
the rule of thumb currently is that a block is created once every
10 minutes. The reward for the creator of a block is the fee of the
transactions it contains in addition to an amount for the block itself
(an amount that halves every 210000 blocks).
Though impressive and revolutionary, the mining process intro-
duces a serious environmental problem due to its massive energy
consumption. This energy use is the focus of this paper. The energy
consumption of the Bitcoin network has been widely discussed in
popular literature over the past few years, and is estimated to be
at least as high as that of some small countries [15]. While many
regard the energy consumption as waste, it plays a crucial role
in securing the network. From this we can see that a more for-
mal definition for "waste" is needed. Once the proper terminology
is established, solutions that reduce energy consumption can be
examined thoroughly.
There have been two major flavors of solutions that address the
issue of energy consumption in PoW systems. The first attempts to
minimize, or even eliminate the energy consumption used by cryp-
tocurrencies. We mention a few of these in the following section.
The second, and noticeably less studied, is the option of using the
outcome of the computations performed by Bitcoin at the end of
the mining process. We will focus on the latter in this work.
One could argue that the fact that the energy used to mine
Bitcoins ensures its security is enough to deem it not wasteful.
1In Bitcoin, h is double application of the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, but
the definition extends to any preimage resistant function.
250% according to Nakamoto in [14], 33% taking into account selfish mining such as
[7] etc.
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However, the fact remains that the computations currently being
performed by Bitcoin miners have no other merit except for being
"hard". Once a result to the puzzle is found, it is verified and then
never used again. The main question studied in this work is whether
this need not be the case. Can one design a PoW system in which
the results of the computation can be useful for real life applications
while maintaining the property of being "sufficiently hard" and not
subject to manipulation?
We make the case that mining is wasteless if the problems that
the mining process solves are "meaningful". We consider problems
to bemeaningful if users are willing to paymoney for their solutions
in some setting external to the mining process. If so, we claim
that the mining process "saved" electricity in that external system,
and "used" the electricity that went into mining for solving that
problem. Thus we require that a wasteless mining systems will
enable users to request problems that they need to be solved. We
will use, for this reason, the terms "Meaningful" and "User Uploaded"
interchangeably.
In addition, we show that in order for the mining process to
be truly wasteless, the algorithm used by the mining process to
solve each individual problem must in fact be the optimal algorithm
(otherwise the external system would require less electricity for
the same task, deeming the mining process wasteful). We connect
this insight to a property which we refer to as "energy efficiency".
Finally, any wasteless mining system must still remain secure
according to the standard notions of security in the Blockchain
world today.
We therefore explore the world of mining systems that uphold
all three properties - (1) Meaningful (User Uploaded), (2) Energy-
Efficient and (3) Secure.
1.1 Related Work
Before we dive into our results, we first stop to discuss previous
attempts in tackling the issue of energy consumption in cryptocur-
rencies, some of which are: "Proof of Stake" studied by Bentov et
al in [2], Gilad et al. in [9], and later expanded by Ben Tove et al.
in [2], Kiayias in [10] and many more. They replace energy with
a different resource. Another approach is "Proof of Space", intro-
duced by Dziembowski in [6] replaces energy with physical storage.
While these approaches avoid the immediate problem of energy
waste, they incur waste in other domains (such as physical storage
or liquid currency). Therefore, we consider these approaches to be
only as partial solutions. These methods are outside the scope of
this paper, but we will comment how our results may be applicable
to them in the conclusions section of this paper.
We will focus on an approach first presented by King in [11],
and again by Ball, Rosen et al. in [1]. They introduce the notion of
"Proof of Useful Work". In these systems, the outputs of the "mining
computation" are supposed to be meaningful.
Both of these works however do not allow users to upload their
own problems, rather the problems are dictated by the system. We
claim that in order to make such systems favorable, users must
be allowed to upload computational tasks that have some value to
them in order to avoid energy waste. Enabling users to upload real
problems to which they need a solution, in a way that is provably
secure against adversaries or double spend attacks can be a huge
improvement, as energy will inevitably be exerted in order to solve
these problems. For these reasons, these works do not meet our
definition of solving meaningful problems.
A step forward in implementing useful proofs of work has been
done in [18], however it is strongly based on 2 facts: (i) The assump-
tion that the hardware enforces correct reporting of work (and it
cannot be fooled), and (ii) The assumption that all miners use this
very specific hardware (Intel SGX instructions). This in fact can be
viewed as a special case of the general solution we describe here,
where a trusted setup can count the complexity on the computation.
We elaborate of this in appendix B.
In [1] writers present a useful proof of work system. They how-
ever do not present a proof of security against double spend attacks
(as in the original Bitcoin protocol).
The idea of “Hybrid mining" was proposed in many papers,
such as [4], [16] and [19], in which miners can choose to work
on solving problems or in increasing the blockchain’s weight. We
argue that these systems are not energy efficient because there are
contradicting incentives between investing computational power
into the security of the blockchain, and into solving other problems
for a fee. Thus, there are still significant resources that will go to
waste just to keep the system secure, as well as a security decrease
due to computational power which is diverted away from mining.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper we formally define the notion of "wasted energy". We
say that energy invested in a computation is "wasted" if no one
is willing to pay for the result of the computation independently
from the mining procedure (i.e. no one would pay money for this
computation in an external system). From this we deduce that a
“meaningful problem” is one that someone is willing to pay for.
We take a close look at the trade-off between solving meaningful
problems, reducing marginal computation work, and keeping the
system secure against double spend attackers. Formally, we define
three desired properties for a "non-wasteful" proof of work system:
(1) Meaningful Problems - The results of computations per-
formed by miners should be of interest to some user. We
measure interest by economic incentive - the user must be
willing to pay enough money for the result of the compu-
tation. A simple economic analysis in Section 5 shows that
this definition can be reduced to "User Uploaded" problems.
(2) Energy Efficiency - The additional functionality should not
increase the amount of energy needed to solve the prob-
lems (or the amount of increase is provably small), and the
algorithms used to solve the problems are optimal.
(3) Security - Our security model will be the same as in the origi-
nal Bitcoin paper [14] in the sense that the system should by
secure against double spend attacks by a minority attacker
with overwhelming probability. In particular our definition
coincides with the common prefix property as defined by
Garay et al. in [8].
We discuss existing attempts at creating PoW systems that solve
meaningful problems. In particular we survey existing solutions
under the lens of these three properties, and show that to this day
the only existing solution [18] which upholds all three properties
requires trusted hardware.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the intersections of the
three requirements compared to state of the art systems to-
day
We now present, in high level, conditions which we prove are
necessary for a system that meets all 3 requirements:
(1) Solving user-uploaded problems is an integral and manda-
tory part of the mining process (namely, miners cannot
choose if they want to solve user uploaded problems or not).
(2) Miners must supply a proof that they attempted to solve
user-uploaded problems. These proofs need to be easy to
verify and "unfakeable" given any prior knowledge on the
problems, the solution or any structural information on the
problem (including the answer to the problem).
(3) Anyone with computational resources should be econom-
ically incentivized to solve a problem within the mining
process rather than offline (being payed by someone for find-
ing a valid solution to the problem in some offline setting).
(4) The computational requirements for solving a mining objec-
tive should be known to the system (or the system should be
able to evaluate them). This means the system should have
prior knowledge on the computational resources it take to
evaluate the function on every input, or measure precisely
the amount of work that went into each computation.
(5) Following the previous point, unless there is trusted report-
ing of the amount of computational work done by a user,
the system should only allow users to upload problems for
which every case is the "worse case" (For example, inverting
one-way functions).
1.3 Structure
The structure of this paper is as follows:
In section 2 we formally define the model for a mining proof of
work system and mining objectives. We explain how these defini-
tions are a generalization and abstraction of existing proof-of-work
systems. In addition, we formally define the property of energy-
efficiency. In section 3 we analyze properties that must exist in any
such systems in order for them to meet the security definitions
that are standard in the field. We fully characterize the family of
possible mining systems. We discuss how\whether current proof of
work systems meet these definitions.
In section 4 we present a possible implementation of a mining
system which meets all 3 criteria. In section 5 we discuss a basic
economic approach of systems which allow user uploaded mining
objectives. Finally, in section 6 we discuss some future directions.
2 FORMAL MODEL FOR MINING SYSTEMS
Until now we have discussed in high-level the desired properties
of Proofs of Useful Work systems, and why existing solutions fail.
In this Section we dive into detail, and formalize the properties
that we believe any wasteless mining system must uphold. We
then analyze these properties carefully, and derive limitations and
restrictions that any such system must follow. After we define and
understand these limitations, we introduce our own solution, which
is (1) secure, (2) energy efficient and (3) performs meaningful work,
according to our definitions.
We first define security in REMSs. Our definitions use notations
inspired by Boneh et al. in [3], which discusses general Verifiable
Delay Functions, and the definitions coincide with the ones in [8],
which discusses Bitcoin specifically. In particular, our definitions
of security still are with respect to common prefix property and
the chain quality property which should be upheld as long as an
honest majority of the computational power in the network still
exists. We do not change or interfere with these definitions in any
way.
2.1 Definitions
Definition 1 (Mining Objective). Let D ∈ N. A mining objec-
tive is a pair ⟨f ,y⟩ where f is a function and y ∈ Im(f ). 3 We will
say that a mining objective ⟨f ,y⟩ was solved if some x ∈ {0, 1}D was
found such that f (x) = y. 4
We will later see how the above definition coincides the Bitcoin
mining system.
Definition 2 (REMS). A Repeated Eval Mining System S =
(F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is a quadruple defined as follows:
• F is a set of mining objectives.
• Setup() → ek a randomized, polynomial time algorithm that
takes no parameters, and returns an evaluation key ek , which
is unpredictable to all players.
• Eval(F , ek,x) → (y,π ) is a polynomial time algorithm which
takes an input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and produces an output y ∈ Y .
Where Y = {T,F} × {T,F}F . The first coordinate of y ∈ Y
is an indication of whether the seed x results in a successful
mine (a block was created), and the rest is an indicator vector
of which mining objectives were solved by x . π ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a
(possibly empty) proof π . 5
3In Bitcoin f = SHA256 and y is a binary string smaller than the current difficulty
D .
4A more general definition of a mining objective would be a pair ⟨f , Y ⟩ such that
Y ⊆ Im(f ) and a solution is x ∈ {0, 1}D s.t. there exists y ∈ Y s.t. f (x ) = y . We
will omit this for the ease of notation, but all of our analysis can be easily generalized
to this case.
5In this paper when we say "proof" we mean some function of the output of the
computation Eval . It may be interesting to think about systems in which the proof
can be independent of the output (such as in [18]), however this is outside the scope
of this paper.
• Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) → {T,F} is a deterministic polyno-
mial time algorithm which returns T if y,π a valid output of
Eval(F , ek,x), and F otherwise.
In an REMS, repeated calls to Eval are made, and when a query
returns y[0] = T then a mining attempt was successful, and we will
refer to this as a new block was mined.
For example, in today’s Bitcoin, ek is the hash of the previ-
ous block, x is some string in {0, 1}256, and there exists a param-
eter DB , such that F = {⟨SHA256 (ek ◦ x) ,y⟩ |∀y s.t y ≤ DB }.
Eval(F , ek,x) executes SHA256 on ek ◦ x , gets an output yˆ, and
returns the vector y and proof π = x where: ∀ ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F it holds
that y ⟨f ,y ⟩ = T i.f.f yˆ == y, and y[0] = T i.f.f. one of the objectives
was solved. Veri f y returns T i.f.f the proof (in this case π = x)
maintains that the hash of ek ◦ π is at most DB .
The following two definitions will describe two necessary condi-
tions for any REMS system - Correctness and Soundness (regardless
off the energy efficiency question).
Definition 3 (Soundness). We will say that an REMS S =
(F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is sound if for every algorithm A that runs
in timeO(poly(ek)), and ek which is sampled uniformly from {0, 1}D :
If the output of A(ek) is (xek ,yek ,πek ) then
Pr [veri f y(ek,xek ,yek ,πek ) = T∧
∧ (yek ,πek ) , Eval(ek,xek )] ≤ 2−|ek |
Definition 4 (Correctness). We will say that an REMS S =
(F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is correct if Eval(F , ek,x) = (y,π ) =⇒
veri f y(ek,x ,y,π ) = T.
From now on, we will only discuss REMS’s which are both Sound
and Correct.
Throughout the following sections, for the sake of ease of no-
tations, assume that for every x the task of evaluating f (x) takes
the same amount of computational resources for every f ∈ F .
Moreover, we assume from now on that Eval consumes a constant
amount of computational resources per execution. We will address
the general case and discuss why these assumptions is not necessary
in Section 6.
Definition 5 (Blockchain). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y)
be an REMS. A linked list of blocks B1, · · · ,Bn is called a blockchain
if for every block B = (ekB ,xB ,yB ,πB ) in the blockchain, it holds
thatVeri f y(F , ekB ,xB ,yB ,πB ) = T. Moreover denote the following:
B1 is called the genesis block, Bn is the head, and n is the weight of
the blockchain.
Throughout this paper we do not deviate from the notion of
consensus as presented in the original Bitcoin paper by see [14].
Note that in the above definition, we assume that every block
for which Veri f y returns T is a block with the same weight as all
other blocks. This notion can in theory be generalized, however we
will not go into this case in this work.
Definition 6 (Computational Resources Demands). Let S =
(F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be an REMS. Let ⟨f ,y⟩ be a mining objec-
tive in F .
6 We assume that Eval runs in polynomial time in size(x ).
(1) We denote Df the computational resources necessary to com-
pute the value f (x) for any x ∈ {0, 1}D , assuming the com-
putation is executed by the optimal algorithm for computing
f (x).
(2) DenoteC ⟨f ,y ⟩ the computational resources necessary, in expec-
tation, to find a solution x ∈ {0, 1}D such that f (x) = y, where
x is sampled uniformly from {0, 1}D . Again, the computation
assumed the optimal algorithm for computing f (x).
2.2 Security, Energy Efficiency, Meaningfulness
Our adversarial model is the same model as in [8]. In particular, we
assume that the attacker can first observe the activity of the honest
nodes and be the last player to decide on a strategy, and that he
can change the content of his own messages at will. We assume
that he is computationally bounded and that regular cryptographic
assumptions hold (especially that the attacker can not invert one
way functions efficiently).
Definition 7 (Secure REMS). LetS = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y)
be an REMS. Let F be a family of mining objectives in F . Letm be a
miner in the system.We say that the REMSS = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y)
is secure if it holds that:
Pr [m finds some x such that Eval(F , ek,x)0 = T] =[
# Executions of Eval fromm
# Executions of Eval across the network
]
Wherem gets to choose the distribution over {0, 1}D from which she
samples x (without knowing ek).
The guarantee should be that an attacker can not create blocks
faster than his\her ratio of the total computational power in the
network. This means that the "cryptopuzzle" should uphold the
property that
Pr (Userm solves the puzzle) =
=
Computational power ofm
Total computational power in the network
If this property does not hold we say that the system is vulnerable
to double spend attacks by a minority attacker.
Note that this notion of security coincides with the notion of
security in “The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol" [8] (in their notations,
each player contributes a single vote, so a user that controls a
mining pool of size m players, out of the total n players in the
network, creates mn of the blocks). As shown there, this is enough
to ensure that the common prefix property and the chain quality
property are maintained in the system.
Definition 8 (Meaningful REMS). We say that a mining ob-
jective ismeaningful if there exists someone willing to pay for the
resources that are required to solve it regardless of the mining process.
We say that an REMS S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is meaningful
if all of the mining objectives in F are meaningful.
Due to to Definition 8 we will from now on use the terms
“meaningful” and “user-uploaded” interchangeably.
Definition 9 (Secure-User-Uploaded REMS). Let [M] be the
set of all the users in a system (including all miners) . Let F be a set of
mining objectives that was chosen by [M] 7. We say that it is secure
user-uploaded if S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) secure.
Definition 9 is the formalization of the combination two of the
conditions discussed in the introduction. Notice that the require-
ment that the mining objective was chosen by the miner (and not
a user that is participating only through uploading problems) is
necessary in order to ensure security. This is because we want
any such solution to be resistant to miners maliciously uploading
problems in order to increase their chances of successfully mining
a block8, which can lead to a double spend.
For the next part of our definitions we use the following intuition:
We say that a mining objective ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F is meaningful if there
is someone who is willing to pay for the computational resources
that are needed in order to solve it. We would like to make sure
that any system that meets our requirements will only allow for
meaningful objectives to belong to F . Since this is not yet well
defined, we begin with the following softer definition of energy
efficiency. Combining this notion with the fact that F is composed
of user uploaded problems, we can describe necessary conditions
for systems in which all mining objectives are meaningful.
Definition 10. [ϵ-Energy Efficient REMS] Let ϵ > 0. We say that
a mining system S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is energy efficient if
it holds that for every x ∈ {0, 1}D the energy ratio:
Σ ⟨f ,y ⟩∈FDf
computing Eval (F , ek,x) > 1 − ϵ
That is, the system can make sure that the percent of energy used for
solving user uploaded problems is arbitrarily close to 1.
From now on, any time we say that a claim holds for an “energy-
efficient” REMS, we mean that it holds for an ϵ-energy-efficient
REMS for every ϵ ≥ 0
3 NECESSARY PROPERTIES OF REMS’S -
FORMAL ANALYSIS
In this section we will prove our main theorems about Repeated
Evaluation Mining systems. We will fully characterize the allowed
set of functions that may belong to F in the case of REMS’s which
are Secure,Energy Efficient and Meaningful.
The claims are organized in the following structure. First, we
discuss secure REMS’s and show two basic properties which we
prove are necessary for any REMS to be secure: The function Eval
should be optimally efficient and the relationship between mining a
block and solving a mining objective should be correlative to “how
hard" the objective is.
Next, we refine the discussion to secure & energy-efficient REMS,
wherein we introduce the proof π to our analysis. We initially
shows that “hard-enough" proofs are mandatory in order to keep
the system energy-efficient. Additionally, projecting the above basic
properties on this scenario we prove (i) Eval should be optimally
efficient in generating the proof, and (ii) the relationship between
finding a coherent proof and solving a mining objective should be
correlative as above.
7In particular, a minerm ∈ [M ] may have any non trivial amount of information
about any mining objective ⟨f , y ⟩ ∈ F, such as a solution x for which f (x ) = y .
8In Bitcoin this would translate to a miner being able to artificially increase her relative
computational power in the network.
In the last subsection we show our main theorems which hold
for (1) secure (2) energy-efficient and (3) user uploaded REMSs. We
combine the constraints on Eval , and deduce from them constraints
on the allowed set of mining objectives in any secure, energy-
efficient and user uploaded REMS.
3.1 Secure REMS
Claim 1 (Eval is optimal). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be
a secure REMS. Then there does not exist any algorithm Eval ′ that
is more efficient than Eval such that S′ = (F , Setup,Eval ′,Veri f y)
is sound. 9
The proof is in Appendix C
In the following claim, we formalize the following notion: In a
secure REMS, solving each mining objective will result in success-
fully mining with a probability that is proportional to the resources
demand of the objective.
Claim 2. For any ⟨f ′,y′⟩ ∈ F it holds that:
Pr (x results in a block | f (x) = y) =
Pr
(
x results in a block | f ′(x) = y′) · C ⟨f ,y ⟩
C ⟨f ′,y′⟩
The proof is in Appendix C
Where C ⟨f ,y ⟩ is the expected amount of computational power
required for Finding a solution x that satisfies ⟨f ,y⟩.
If this assumption does not hold, the system should in fact be
able to adjust the weight of the block according to the amount
C ⟨f ,y ⟩ for the relevant ⟨f ,y⟩ which resulted in the block creation.
Corollary 1. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure-
energy-efficient REMS. Assume that mining a block depends on
solving the mining objectives. Then C ⟨f ,y ⟩ must be known to the
system.
3.2 Secure & Energy-Efficient REMS
We now turn our attention to analyzing the energy efficiency re-
quirement and some basic properties that must be kept in order
for it to hold. Namely we show that the energy efficiency property
implies that the system shouldn’t use much energy beside solving
the mining objectives.
The following claim is the first time we consider the proofs as
a tool for enforcing that miners indeed solve mining objectives,
which we will be important for the rest of our claims. It is also
important since it formally captures the following intuition: Miners
must always be incentivised to solve the mining objective, rather
than generating proofs in some way that is external to the system.
Claim 3. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be an energy effi-
cient REMS. Then miners must supply proofs of attempting to solve
mining objectives from F as part of the mining process. Furthermore,
the computational difficulty of computing Eval is lower than the
difficulty of finding a proof π for which Veri f y evaluates to T
The proof for claim 3 appears in Appendix D.
9This condition means that Eval is the optimal algorithm for the computational task
which mining is based on.
Claim 4. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure and en-
ergy efficient REMS. Then Eval is the optimal algorithm for gener-
ating the proof π given setup ek .
The proof for claim 4 appears in Appendix D.
Discussion 1. In claim 1 We proved that Eval must execute the
optimal algorithm for solving mining objectives in F . In claim 4 we
showed that Eval is the optimal algorithm for generating proofs at
attempting to solve mining objectives from F . We point out that in
the special case that the proof of trying to solve a mining objective
⟨f ,y⟩ using input x , is exactly the output f (x), then the two claims
are identical. However, in the general setting, this need not be the case.
We will further discuss this special case of the output being the proof
later in Theorem 2.
Claim 5. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure-energy-
efficient REMS. LetF = {⟨f1, z1, . . . , ⟨fn , zn⟩⟩} be themining objec-
tives. Then for any ⟨fi ,yi ⟩ ,
〈
fj ,yj
〉 ∈ F and for allx = x1x2 . . . xn ∈
{0, 1}D , for any algorithm used to generate proofs it holds that:
Pr
(
Find y,π s.t.:
Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) = T|Eval(F , ek,x)〈
fi ,zi
〉 = T) =
C ⟨fi ,zi ⟩
C⟨fj ,zj ⟩
·Pr
(
Find y,π s.t.:
Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) = T|Eval(F , ek,x)〈
fj ,zj
〉 = T)
Where y is the output of Eval(F , ek,x).
The proof for Claim 5 appears in Appendix D.
From the above we conclude that the objectives F can only
contain problems for which it is hard to generated pairs (x ,π ) for
which Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y′,π ) will be evaluated to true. So in order
for an objective ⟨f ,y⟩ to be legal, it should be both (1) equally hard
to solve across all users and (2) equally hard to generate a proof for
all users.
For example, assume that a system can be designed through
utilizing mining objectives that are 3-SAT problems, and the proofs
are possible assignments (i.e. ⟨Φ,y⟩ where Φ is a 3-SAT formula,y =
T and the proof π is a binary string symbolizing which variables in
Φ are T or F). Assume in addition that an adversary miner has some
small amount of non-trivial information about a mining objective
Φ (for instance, the adversary may know that for any assignment
x it holds that in Φ(x) at most half of the clauses are satisfiable).
Then the miner can avoid verifying the assignment to every clause
in Φ if he\she discovers that half of the clauses have already been
satisfied, reducing the amount of computations this attacker has
to use for the task of solving Φ. This way the attacker increases
their relative power in the system, again increasing their chance of
a successful double spend attack.
Corollary 2. Let F be a family of secure problems, and S is an
energy-efficient mining system. Then ∀ ⟨f , s⟩ ∈ F , it holds that f is
in NP .
An immediate result of what we have now seen is that proofs
of attempts of running mining objectives from F need to be hard
to fake. How hard - for a mining objective ⟨f ,y⟩ it should be at
least as hard as finding x such that f (x) = y; But this is exactly the
amount C ⟨f ,y ⟩
We will henceforth assume that the proof π which is the output
of Eval contains proofs of attempts at running mining objectives
from F .
3.3 Secure & Energy-Efficient & User-Uploaded
REMS
From this point on, we will discuss the user-uploaded property. In
this case, we will show that the above claims need to hold for every
y ∈ {0, 1}D in the sense that if a mining objective ⟨f ,y⟩ is allowed
to be in F , then it holds that the system must have information on
the amounts Df and C ⟨f ,z ⟩ for every z ∈ {0, 1}D .
Theorem 1 (Secure Energy Efficient User Uploaded REMS).
Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure-energy-efficient-
user-uploaded REMS.
Therefore for a function f to be a legal mining objective, for every
y ∈ {0, 1}D it must hold that C ⟨f ,y ⟩ is known. 10
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix E
In the following theorem we will take a closer look at the fam-
ily of allowed mining objectives in secure-energy-efficient-user-
uploaded REMS’s. We will show that in the setting in which we
restrict ourselves to the case where the proofs generated by Eval
are the output of each objective, we have that F may contain only
preimage resistance functions (definition 12 can be found in appen-
dix C).
Theorem 2 (Pre-Image Resistance Property). Let an REMS
S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be secure-energy-efficient-user-uploaded.
Assume in addition that the proof generated by Eval at index i ∈ [|F |]
given input x is exactly fi (x). Then it holds that the family F contains
only preimage resistant functions.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix E
To give an intuition to the above, we can draft the steps as: given
a mining objective ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F , it holds that
Pr [Veri f y ⟨f ,y ⟩(F , ek,ALG(z), z, z) = T] =
Pr [Eval ⟨f ,y ⟩(F , ek,ALG(z)) = z] = Pr [f (ALG(z)) = z](
the first equality is because Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y, z) is actually the
function Eval ⟨f ,y ⟩(F , ek,x) == f (x) for all ⟨f ,y⟩
)
. Thus if f is
not preimage resistant, then Veri f y is inversable.
Discussion 2. From all that we have shown above, it stem that
there are two options for designing proof of useful work system (under
the restrictions that were discussed above):
• REMS in which block creation depends of the successful solution
of user-uploaded mining objectives. In this case, we have from
Claim 2 and Corollary 1 that for any ⟨f ′,y′⟩ ∈ F ,
Pr (x results in a block | f (x) = y) =
Pr
(
x results in a block | f ′(x) = y′) · C ⟨f ,y ⟩
C ⟨f ′,y′⟩
10The difference between this claim and Corollary 1 is that here we also quantify over
every y ∈ {0, 1}D , whereas in the corollary we quantify only over x ’s
And that the system should know to adjust the odds of block cre-
ation according to the amountsC ⟨f ,y ⟩ for allmining objectives
that a user may upload to the system. For instance, if the sys-
tem allows to upload both instances of SHA256 and MD5, then
the amount of computations needed for a pair ⟨SHA256,y⟩
and ⟨MD5, z⟩ should be known for any y, z ∈ {0, 1}256. This
is a very harsh restriction for a system designer. One way in
which it can be enforced is as in [18] by counting the number of
CPU operation based on the additional assumption of trusted
hardware.
• REMS in which problem solving is an integrated part of mining,
but the success in solving a problem does not directly affect the
chances of mining a block. In this setting, miners have to try to
solve mining objectives as a requirement of the mining process,
but the odds of creating a block are not affected if a miner did
or did not solve a mining objective along the way. This means
that finding a solution to a mining objectives is a byproduct of
mining, but not the objective. We will describe such a system
in the following section.
We have now fully characterized the space of possible Secure,
Energy Efficient and Meaningful Repeated Evaluation Mining
Systems. We have show that for all practical uses, without any
assumptions of trust (hardware or otherwise), the only type of
allowed mining objectives in such systems must be preimage re-
sistance functions. On one hand, this is discouraging, as it gravely
limits the amount of meaningful computation that can be diverted
from traditional computing farms towards mining systems. On the
other hand, we claim that this still leaves room for some hope. In
the next section we present an implementation of an REMS that is
secure, energy efficient and allows for user uploaded problems.
4 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE ENERGY
EFFICIENT USER UPLOADED REMS
In this section we formally define our suggested protocol. Our
model strongly corresponds to the original Bitcoin protocol, and
as such, any property that has not been specifically mentioned
can be assumed to be untouched and remain loyal to the Bitcoin
protocol. Our construction does deviate from the Bitcoin protocol
in some aspects, namely the block creation rule and a new type of
transaction.
4.1 Bitcoin Mining Protocol
In Bitcoin, blocks are created in the following way: each miner
guesses random strings. For each string r , the miner calculates a
binary string SHA2(SHA2(Hek ◦ r )), Where Hek is the header of
the block that the miner tries to mine, which contains the previous
block hash (which is unpredictable, thus can be considered as ek),
its address, a commitment to the transactions the block contains
and more. A miner gets to mine a new block if it holds that the
output of the computation is smaller than some global parameter
D (which is referred to as the difficulty parameter). This process is
what is called "Bitcoin Mining".
4.2 Modified Protocol - A High level
Description
We begin with a high-level description of our secure-energy-
efficient-user-uploaded REMS and in the following sections we
will formally describe how everything is realized and prove correct-
ness.
In order to describe the protocol more simply, we will consider
only one type of problems - trimmed output of SHA256m form ∈ N.
We will describe how this protocol can be generalized in section
4.5.
In our system, users can upload problems to the system using a
new type of transaction. The transaction holds the prize that the
user offers in exchange to a solution to his problem. The problem
itself is an output of a SHA256 towhich they need the corresponding
input.
Uploaded problems are partitioned into ”active" and ”non-active"
problems, according to whether they were solved. The mining
process works as follows: Miners choose a subset S of a fixed size
of the active problems. After committing to this subset, they start
guessing binary strings and if they succeed a block is mined.
The commitment is done by writing a Merkle tree of the set S in
the header of the block being attempted (similar to what happens
in the coin-base transaction in Bitcoin today).
Our solution ensures that a miner will work on all problems they
committed to by pipelining the (untrimmed) result of one problem
as the input to the next. Only the output of the last problem in S
might generate a block.
The miners, as in Bitcoin, generate a seed that is concatenated
to the block header that they try to mine, and use the result as
the input to the first problem. If a miner finds a solution to one of
the problems while attempting to mine a block, she will publish
the seed as a new transaction, and collect the prize to the problem.
A block was mined only if the final output meets the difficulty
requirements.
Let us formally define a class of problems, that we use later to
describe the problems that our system will be able to solve.
Definition 11. SHA256 trimmed output problem is a problem
with the form (m, f , t ,y) where m, f , t ∈ N, s ∈ {0, 1}∗. In this
problem, the goal is to find a x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that SHA256(x)m [f :
t] = y, where [f : t] means to take the bits from index f to index t .
An example problem is upper bounding SHA256’s output by
demanding that the first D bits should equals 00 · · · 0 (which is
close to Bitcoin’s mining objective form = 1, f = 0, t = D).
4.3 Modified Protocol - Formal Description
The system S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) contains the following
elements:
4.3.1 Mining Objectives in F . User-uploaded problems must be
of the form ⟨f ,y⟩ where f is a function and y is a well formatted
output of f . We defineF be limited to contain only trimmed outputs
of SHA256m form ∈ N. We later discuss how this family can be
expanded slightly, while still keeping in line with the results from
the previous section.
Users may upload mining objectives through a new special type
of transaction, which will contain a description of the problem,
alongside a deposit which can be withdrawn trough supplying a
valid solution to the problem11. When a miner finds a solution to a
mining objective, she can publish a transaction with the solution.
The solution contains the solver’s public key within it as the recipi-
ent of the deposited prize. So in order to hijack the solution a miner
must be able to find collisions in SHA256. A schematic illustration
of this mechanism can be found in Figure 2.
In addition we limit F to be the set of “Active Problems”, de-
fined in the follwoing way: Given a user-uploaded problem, it is
considered active as long as it complies with the two following
requirements:
• It has not yet been solved in previous blocks.
• It’s solution isn’t a part of the block’s transactions.
4.3.2 Setup() → ek . Setup() → ek is simply the hash (SHA256)
of the latest block header in the system (the last leaf on the longest
chain).
4.3.3 Eval(F , ek,x) → (y,π ). Given a set of the active mining
objectives: F = ⟨f1,y1⟩ , . . . ,
〈
f |F | ,y |F |
〉
. A miner first chooses
a subset S ⊆ F of size k. The miner will query Eval using the
input parameters S, ek,x 12. The miner will then calculate s0 = H ,
where H holds the information on the block that he’s trying to
mine (including the previous block hash ek , his identity, Merkle
root of S and Merkle root of the transactions that he includes in
the block) and then for every active user-uploaded problem, the
miner checks if the assignment f (si−1) = yi . If not, the miner sets
si = fi (si−1) and keeps going. 13. If at any point l ∈ [|S |] it holds
that f (sl−1) = yl , the miner may publish a transaction with the
proof14 and collect the fee offered by the problem-uploader. Finally,
a block is mined if s |S | ≤ D (where D is the difficulty parameter). A
schematic illustration of this mechanism can be found in Figure 3.
The output y is generated in the following way:
• y[0] = T if s |F | ≤ D (where D is the difficulty parameter on
the system). Otherwise, y[0] = F.
• For all i ∈ [|F |], y[i] = T if it holds that f (si−1) = yi .
Otherwise, y[i] = F.
The proof π is simply the output of the last objective. I.e. π =
f |F |(s |F |−1)
A very important comment is that k should be equal to the
number of different functions (before the trimming) that are in S . If
S contains multiple problems that are a different trimming of the
same output, then the miner needs to calculate the output once,
and check all of the possible yi ’s against this output. We assume
the overhead of these checks, given the output of the function, is
negligible (and can be computed in parallel) when compared to the
execution of the function15.
11The solution has to be well formatted in the sense that it has to contain the header
information of the relevant block at the time of solution. This is important in order to
proof compliance with the requirement of unpredictability describes in the firs section.
12If there aren’t enough problems in F, then the miner most add problems to S from
a list of problems accepted by the system
13If the trimming of fi−1 is to strong, then this may degenrate the outputs space of
fi (si−1)- this is why we will always use the output before the trimming.
14The proof will be s0 , and this way the miner is safe from anyone hijacking the
solution, since B contains the miners’ information
15We can remove this assumption and allow only a single occurrence of each f in S .
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Figure 2: Modified block creation mechanism to allow solv-
ing user uploaded preimage resistance functions as part of
the mining process.
Otherwise Eval is not the optimal algorithm for solving the
group of the mining objectives (altogether), which is a contradiction
to the definition of energy efficient.
4.3.4 Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) → {T,F}. Veri f y works as expected:
Checks whether π equals f |S |(s |S |−1), and that y[0] = T (i.e. s |S | ≤
D).
4.3.5 Prize Collection. If a miner finds a solution to a mining objec-
tive, she publishes a special transaction with the solution. Since the
seed to the solution contains the public key of the miner, everyone
can verify that the solution is correct and that she is the legal recip-
ient of the prize. Miners are incentivized to include this transaction
in their newly created block because of the transaction’s fee, just
like any other transaction.
4.4 Liveness
We notice that the probability of mining a block is the same com-
pared to the Bitcoin protocol, so our guarantees of liveness stems
from that of the original Bitcoin protocol. Meaning that the system
continues to create blocks even if no problems are uploaded by
users (though in this case there does exist the same waste of energy
as in Bitcoin).
Moreover, we keep the incentives for the honest miners to keep
mining blocks because they still get the block reward and the trans-
actions fees. Therefore any honest transaction will eventually end
up deep enough in an honest chain, assuming there’s an honest
majority.
Figure 3: Our modified mining mechanism.
The only thing to make sure is that the new special transactions
will be included. We claim that they will, since hijacking the solu-
tion is computationally infeasible (for an adversary whom cannot
reverse preimage resistant functions). So miners gain nothing be
ignoring such transactions, and are incentivised to include them
via transaction fees.
4.5 Generalizing and Restrict the Family of
allowed problems
In subsection 4.3.1 We limited the discussion to trimmed SHA256m
problems to simplify the model. This section will discuss a possible
generalization, in which we broaden the allowed set of problems.
We show that although we can generalize our protocol and keep it
secure, the allowed problems and protocol still must have restric-
tions.
From Claim 2 and the fact that mining a block and solving a
mining objective is independent, we need to enforce that each
attempt to mine a block has the same computational demands. Each
attempt to mine a block is actually executing all the problems in
the chosen group of problems (that was denoted by S), therefore
we have to constraint the possible groups.
One option to do so is by defining a "score" to each type of
problem. Then, the protocol can enforce “fixed score" for S and
thus control the computational resources of each execution of Eval
(each attempt to mine a block). Note that this implicitly holds in
the above suggestion because we demanded a “fixed size" if S , and
there is only a single type of allowed problem.
We offer the following example to guide the readers intuition -
Suppose the system allowed two families of functions as mining
objectives - trimmed outputs of SHA256 and trimmed outputs of
MD5 (instead of allowing only trimmed SHA256). Eval will be de-
signed as follows - always run SHA256 for k1 times and then MD5
for k2. Such a system meets all the formal requirements for security,
user uploaded problems and energy efficiency (since these are ques-
tions uploaded by users whom are willing to pay for the output of
the computation). This can be further extended to include other
one-way functions, as long as their proportions remain controlled.
5 RELATING ENERGY EFFICIENCY TO
MARKET POWERS - PRICING MINING
OBJECTIVES EFFECTIVELY
Throughout this paper we discuss the possibility of users uploading
computational puzzles to which they need solution, alongside a
fee. A miner which solves the problem collects the fee. We would
like to discuss why a fee is in fact necessary for the liveness of
the system. Assume for a moment an REMS that is (1) Secure (2)
Energy Efficient and (3) User Uploaded, and users upload problems
without a fee (or with a negligible fee). We claim that if the amount
Block Reward + Problem Fees + Transaction Fees is less than the
amount Energy Needed to Mine+Value of solutions in outside market,
miners will not be incentivised to mine, and would prefer to solve
problems in an offline setting. This is of course harmful to the secu-
rity of the system (since less miners implies less security), and to the
liveness of the system. We however argue that in reality, users will
be incentivised to solve their problems through the REMS, since
the price for a solution within it is lower the any outer market. This
is the result of the REMS miners that are incentivised by block re-
wards and transaction fees in addition to the fee for solving mining
objectives.
In addition, if someone chooses to maliciously upload a mining
objective with a fee that is too small, miners may simply chose
other queuing mining objectives instead, rendering this mining ob-
jective meaningless. The same holds for the case of users uploading
"uninteresting" problems with the sole purpose of wasting energy.
In conclusion, market forces will make the miners to invest their
energy only in interesting, well priced problems.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we formally defined the property of energy efficiency
in Proof of Work systems in the permissionless setting in which
there is no trusted hardware. We used this definition to completely
characterize systems in which the following properties hold: (1)
Security against double spends by a minority attacker (2) Energy
efficiency (3) Meaningful computations. This way we showed a
negative result for different types of Proofs of Useful Work concept.
We show that a system that, in general settings, satisfies all the three
conditions can’t be used to solve general problems in NP . We use
our definitions to construct a Proof of Work system in which users
can upload problems to which they need solutions, alongside a fee.
The mining process solves these problems. The model is derived
by introducing relatively minor changes to the original Bitcoin
protocol, which can be easily and effectively implemented in live
systems. We proved the security and liveness of our architecture as
compared to the original Bitcoin protocol, using the most recent
definitions of security used today in cryptocurrency systems. A
natural question is to extend this analysis to alternatives to proof of
work such as proof of space [6] and proof of stake [12]. In the case
of proofs of space, the question is easily translated into whether
can we use proofs of space for storing data in a way which avoids
unnecessary data duplication, while making sure the data stored is
data that real people in the world are willing to pay to store, all the
while being safe against double spends. We believe that the answer
to this question should be no, up to some degenerate cases. In the
case of proofs of stake, the analogy is less natural and has to do
with measuring the economical loss of storing money in escrow as
compared to keeping it in circulation. We believe that this question
is harder and is of interest.
In Definition 5 we assumed that all blocks must have equal
weight. We believe that this can be generalized to a setting in which
the weight of a block may vary across blocks. In this work, the
system should in fact be able to adjust the weight of the block ac-
cording to the amountC ⟨f ,y ⟩ for the relevant ⟨f ,y⟩ which resulted
in the block creation. This is left as a direction for future work.
One final note is that throughout this paper we assumed that
the amount Df was fixed per function f (meaning that evaluating
f (x) takes the same amount of computational work for every x -
Definition 6). This clearly need not be the case in general. We claim
that this is not a problem. Indeed, if this is not the case, the REMS
should be able to evaluate the amount of computational work that
evaluating f (x) take for all possible x ’s. One possibility for doing
this is presented in [18]. They used trusted hardware to count cpu
cycles, thus they have en exact estimate of the amount of work
that went into computing f (x) for all f ’s and x ’s. Another option
is to only allow F to contain functions for which these amounts
are known (which is the case in our discussion).
Another assumption we made in Definition 7 is that every execu-
tion of Eval takes the same amount of computational resources. It
will be interesting to study whether this is necessary. For instance,
one can think of designing a system in which Eval can determine
the weight of blocks created according to the amount of computa-
tional work that went into its execution (meaning that blocks of
different weights can be created). We notice that if this is the case,
then the proofs provided by the miners can not be the outputs of
the functions in F , as this would be a contradiction to Theorem 2.
If a system of this type can be designed in a secure way, we beleive
that this would be of interest.
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A EXPLICIT DOUBLE SPEND ATTACKWHEN
NOT ALL INSTANCES IN F ARE "EVERY
CASE HARD"
An example of a double spend attack against the blockchain system
presented in [1] where the mining objectives are allowed to be "hard
on average". An attacker uploads an objective ⟨f ,y⟩ which is easier
than the average case. for the sake of this example we will use a
SAT problem Φ = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ . . .∧ (xk−2 ∨ xk−1 ∨ xk ) (where
x1, . . . ,xk are literals), however an example can be generated for
any problem which has an easy\hard instance. Assume that the at-
tacker knows that the first clause is satisfied under any assignment.
Therefor the attacker has an extra bit of information compared to
anyone else on the problem. This means that the attacker has an
extra bit of information in the verification phase for every attempt
of any z ∈ {0, 1}256. She simply doesn’t have to check if the first
clause is satisfied, while all other users do. This means that the
attacker increases her relative computational power, enabling her
to double spend without a majority of the computational power.
B RESOURCE-EFFICIENT MINING IS A
SPECIAL CASE OF OUR SOLUTION
In their paper “Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains” [18],
the authors suggest that miners use special hardware called “Intel
SGX”. This hardware can provide secure instructions counting, and
therefore provide a proof of the invested computational resources
that a miner put into the mining process.
We consider this paper as a special case implementation of our
guidelins. As in our protocol, mining a block is independent of
problems, which proofs that their system meets the conditions
imposed by Claim 2. Their experiments shows the the "overhead"
of their protocol is around 5.8% ∼ 14.4% which states that Claim 4
is true with ϵ ≈ 0.13. The other claims in our paper hold directly
from the design of the secure hardware. Note that they do not
have to demand that the mining objectives be preimage resistance
functions because the conditions of Theorem 2 do not holds; They
build the proofs with the special hardware rather then the output
of the mining objectives.
We consider this protocol and ours as two different approaches to
implement the idea of REMS that we presented in Section 3. On the
one hand, Resource-EfficientMining enforce specific hardware, thus
can solve a wider family of mining objectives and be fully dynamic
through the lifetime of the system. On the other hand, our protocol
does not demand a specific type of hardware, therefore it increases
the accessibility for new miners (lower entrance investment) which
increases the security of the network.
C SECURITY PROOFS
This appendix contains proofs to all claims from Section 3.1 and
known security definitions.
Definition 12 (Preimage Resistance Function). A preimage
resistance function is a function that is easy to compute, but whose
inverse is difficult to compute. More precisely, a preimage resistance
function f holds the property that for every adversary algorithm A
that runs in polynomial time in size(x), Pr [f (A(f (x))) = f (x)] is
negligible. [13, 17]
Claim (1 Eval is optimal). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be
a secure REMS. Then there does not exist any algorithm Eval ′ that
is more efficient than Eval such that S′ = (F , Setup,Eval ′,Veri f y)
is sound. 16
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exist Eval ′ ,
Eval which is more efficient than Eval . Assume w.l.o,g that the
execution of Eval ′ is more efficient than that of Eval by a factor of
α > 1 Assume that an attacker uses Eval ′ instead of Eval , while
all other users use Eval . Then it holds that the portion of block
awarded to the attacker in expectation is:
# executions of attacker using Eval ′
# of executions of Eval + # executions of Eval ′ =
α · # executions of attacker using Eval
# of executions of Eval + # executions of Eval ′ >
# executions of attacker if they used Eval
# of executions of Eval if everyone used Eval
Which is an honest miners’ probability of mining a block. So an
attacker increases the speed at which he\she mines a block as com-
pared to the honest network, which is a contradiction to the notion
of security defined in 7. □
Claim (2). For any ⟨f ′,y′⟩ ∈ F it holds that:
Pr (x results in a block | f (x) = y) =
Pr
(
x results in a block | f ′(x) = y′) · C ⟨f ,y ⟩
C ⟨f ′,y′⟩
Where C ⟨f ,y ⟩ is the expected amount of computational power
required for Finding a solution x that satisfies ⟨f ,y⟩.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a min-
ing protocol which is secure that does not mandate the described
property. If there exists some ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F such that solving ⟨f ,y⟩
increases the chances of mining a block dis-proportionally to the
relative computational power required to compute ⟨f ,y⟩, an at-
tacker may choose to focus on solving ⟨f ,y⟩ instead of using Eval ,
and then run Eval only on the solutions that they discovered for
⟨f ,y⟩. This way, the attacker is in fact utilizing a more efficient
algorithm than Eval for mining a block, in contradiction to Claim 1
where we prove that Eval is optimal. □
16This condition means that Eval is the optimal algorithm for the computational task
which mining is based on.
D ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROOFS
This appendix contains proofs to all claims from Section 3.2.
Claim (3). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be an energy effi-
cient REMS. Then miners must supply proofs of attempting to solve
mining objectives from F as part of the mining process. Furthermore,
the computational difficulty of computing Eval is lower than the
difficulty of finding a proof π for which Veri f y evaluates to T
To prove Claim 3 we will prove Claims 6, 7 and 8, from which
Claim 3 follows.
Claim 6. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be an energy effi-
cient REMS. Then miners must supply proofs of attempting to solve
mining objectives from F as part of the mining process.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that and REMS S =
(F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) is an energy efficient in whichminers do
not need to prove that they attempted to solve the mining objectives
from F .
We look at the operation of Eval . We divide into cases: If Eval
does not perform checkswhether f (x) = y for somex ∈ {0, 1}256, ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈
F , then we have that S is not energy efficient. therefore we can as-
sume that Eval does perform these evaluations. Since we assumed
that the output of Eval does not contain proofs of attempts at solv-
ing (evaluating) the individual objectives ⟨f ,y⟩ along the way,we
can consider the following algorithm: Eval ′ operates in the same
way Eval does, but every time Eval checks whether f (x) = y for
some x ∈ {0, 1}256, ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F , Eval ′ outputs F. This makes Eval ′
faster than Eval , in contradiction to the optimality of Eval which
was proved in Claim 1.
□
We remind the reader that Claim 6 in fact did not require that
the REMS be secure, which differentiates it from all other claims in
this section.
Claim 7. In an ϵ-energy-efficient REMS, the amount of compu-
tational resources that goes into computing Eval is at most
1
1 − ϵ ·
∑
⟨f ,y ⟩∈F
Df
Proof. Immediate from the definition of energy efficient: LetCT
be the amount of computational resources that goes into computing
Eval . From ϵ-energy efficiency we have that:
Σ ⟨f ,y ⟩∈FDf
CT
> 1 − ϵ
I.e.
CT <
Σ ⟨f ,y ⟩∈FDf
1 − ϵ
□
The next claim will expand our definition of soundness to incor-
porate the new addition of proofs that is necessary to encompass
our requirements of energy efficiency. The new addition will be that
the probability of defeatingVeri f y will now also have to be negligi-
ble in the size of π (and not only in the size of x and ek). Until now,
Veri f y just checked that y is indeed the output of Eval(F , ek,x),
but now we also want that verify will examine the proof π .
Claim 8. Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure-energy-
efficient REMS. Let D(Veri f y, ek,x ,y) be the difficulty of the opti-
mal algorithm for generatingπ ∈ {0, 1}256 such thatVeri f y(ek,x ,y,π ) =
T. Thenwe have that it must hold that
∑
⟨f ,y ⟩∈F Df ≤ D(Veri f y, ek,x ,y)
for all x ,y ∈ {0, 1}256.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that
∑
⟨f ,y ⟩∈F Df >
D(Veri f y, ek,x ,y) for some x ,y ∈ {0, 1}256. Then an adversary
may choose to invest resources into his algorithm, Eval ′ which is
inverting Veri f y since it is easier. But from the energy efficiency,
the computational resources that are needed to compute Eval are at
least
∑
⟨f ,y ⟩∈F Df (solving the mining objectives). I.e. The attacker
found an algorithm which is more efficient than Eval to produce
proofs, contradiction to Claim 1. □
From the above three claims we conclude that Claim 3 holds.
Claim (4). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure and
energy efficient REMS. Then Eval is the optimal algorithm for gen-
erating the proof π given setup ek .
Proof. The system is energy efficient, therefore Eval compute
possible solutions to the mining objectives in F and produce proofs.
Assume toward contradiction that there exists more efficient al-
gorithm Eval ′ , Eval s.t. Eval ′ that can generate valid proofs. If an
adversary has access to Eval ′ then he\she can divert computational
power away from solving mining objectives in F (since she can
generate a proof π without trying to solve the mining objectives —
unlike the other miners). This means that Eval is not optimal, in
contradiction to Claim 1. □
Claim (5). Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a
secure-energy-efficient REMS. Let F = {⟨f1, z1, . . . , ⟨fn , zn⟩⟩}
then for any
⟨fi ,yi ⟩ ,
〈
fj ,yj
〉 ∈ F
and for all x = x1x2 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}256, for any algorithm used to
generate proofs it holds that:
Pr
(
Find y,π s.t.:
Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) = T|Eval(F , ek,x)〈
fi ,zi
〉 = T) =
C ⟨fi ,zi ⟩
C⟨fj ,zj ⟩
·Pr
(
Find y,π s.t.:
Veri f y(F , ek,x ,y,π ) = T|Eval(F , ek,x)〈
fj ,zj
〉 = T)
Where y is the output of Eval(F , ek,x).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is some ⟨f , z⟩ ∈
F such that knowing the solution to ⟨f , z⟩ increases the odds of
finding π to satisfy Veri f y by more than the relative difficulty of
solving ⟨f , z⟩. Then an attacker can choose to invest resources in
solving ⟨f , z⟩, and then in finding such π instead of solving all
other mining objectives in F \ {⟨f , z⟩} which contradicts the fact
that that S is an energy-efficient REMS. □
E THEOREMS PROOFS
Theorem (1 Secure Energy Efficient User Uploaded REMS).
Let S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be a secure-energy-efficient-
user-uploaded REMS.
Therefore for a function f to be a legal mining objective, for every
y ∈ {0, 1}256 it must hold that C ⟨f ,y ⟩ is known. 17
17The difference between this claim and Corollary 1 is that here we also quantify over
every y ∈ {0, 1}256 , whereas in the corollary we quantify only over x ’s
Proof. Following the definition of secure-user-uploaded REMS,
we will assume that F is chosen by a malicious user A.
Following Corollary 1, we get that every mining objectives ⟨f ,y⟩
thatAwill choose to put in F most have the property thatC ⟨f ,y ⟩ is
known.A can choose anyy ∈ {0, 1}256 to be in the mining objective,
thus f most hold the claimed property. □
Theorem (2 Pre-Image Resistance Property). Let an REMS
S = (F , Setup,Eval ,Veri f y) be secure-energy-efficient-user-uploaded.
Assume in addition that the proof generated by Eval at index i ∈ [|F |]
given input x is exactly fi (x). Then it holds that the family F contains
only preimage resistant functions.
Proof. We need to show that every f such that ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F
is pre-image resistant. This means that given ⟨f ,y⟩ for any poly-
nomial time algorithm ALG, and every z ∈ {0, 1}256 it holds that
Pr [ALG finds x such that f (x) = z] is negligible in the size of 2 |f ,x,z | .
We remember that from claim 6 we have that π which is returned
by Eval when running on x must contain proofs of attempts at
checking whether f (x) = y for mining objectives ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F . In
addition, from the assumption of this claim we have that given x , f ,
the proof is exactly π ⟨f ,y ⟩ = f (x).
Assume towards a contradiction that there exists ⟨f ,y⟩ ∈ F
which is not preimage resistant (Definition 12). There exists some
polynomial time algorithm ALG which, for a given input z ∈
{0, 1}256 can generate x ’s such that Pr [f (x) = z] for some min-
ing objective ⟨f ,y⟩, is not negligible. This means that ALG is also
a polytime algorithm for generating proofs of attempting to solve
⟨f ,y⟩. This means that ALG is a faster algorithm than Eval for
producing the proof π , which is a contradiction to the optimality
of Eval
□
